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I  would  like to share  with you  the concern  that  I  have  that 
has  developed  over  the course of the last year.  It is a  longer 
term  foreign  policy concern but it is likely to become  one of 
our  more  serious problems  in the course of the rest of ·this 
century.  I'd ask you  to think with  me  about it for  a  few 
minutes  this afternoon before  we  get  to the  questions. 
It has  to do  with  what  I  would  have  to describe as  the 
shift in the center of gravity of u.s.  foreign policy  from  the 
TransAtlantic relationship toward  the  Pacific Basin and 
particularly toward  Japan.  Now,  there  is-nething particularly 
wrong  with that as  a  proposition.  It is true the  United  States 
should have  a  close  relationship with  the  Pacific Basin and 
with  Japan.  But  I  think  there are  some  things that need  to be 
thought  out  in terms  of consequences of this shift. 
First of all,  u.s.  trade with the  Pacific last year,  for 
the  first  time,  exceeded u.s.  trade with  Western  Europe. 
Demographic  changes  in the United States  for  the shift of 
population  from  the  East  Coast  toward  the West  Coast  have 
changed  the outlook of  many  Americans  with  regard  to foreign 
policy interests. - 2  -
Twenty years  ago,  Atlantists were  arguing that as  Western 
Europe built its own  personality it would,  in fact,  strengthen 
the hand of the  United  States in the  conduct of  foreign 
affairs.  This  was  because  the Western  European democracies,  as 
they coalesced and  became  more  powerful,  would  be able to march 
off into the  sunset  with us  in defense  of  democracy  around  the 
world.  We  would  between  the  two of  us  be  so powerful  that  we 
could,  in effect,  control  events around  the world. 
I  think  the fact of  the matter  is that in the process of 
building  Europe,  what  we  have  seen  and  it may  be  a  temporary 
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It is a  fact,  for  example,  that in the State  Dep~rtment a 
rather large office is paid  simply to continue  to put  things 
into the  consultative process  so that  in  NATO  we  are always 
talking about  something:  and  it keeps  that dialogue going and 
it tends  on  occasion,  I  think,  to mislead  us  a  bit  i~~believing 
that  our basic interests have  not  begun  to diverge.  Yet  I 
think it is also true that Western  Europeans,  at least now,  are 
increasingly less interested in dealing with  the stability of 
the  world,  and  far  more  interested  in dealing with stability in 
and  around  their particular geographic  area. 
Let  me  give  you  an  example.  It is  a  well  known  fact  that 
many  Western  Europeans  believe that this Administration has 
been  too harsh  in its rhetoric with  regard  to the Soviet 
Union.  I  don't  happen  to believe that,  but  that's not  the 
point  for  the  moment. 
What  I  think  some  of  us  in the  process of trying to deal 
with  the  Soviet  Union  over  the  course of the last three years 
failed  to understand  adequately was  that,  a  change  in  focus  and 
perceptions had  taken place.  When  we  talked  about  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  ways  in which  we  have  over  the  course of  the last 
three years  we  tended  to frighten Western  Europeans  who  see 
detente  threatened  by  this American  approach.  What  we  fail  to 
see,  I  think,  as  well  is that  whether  we  like it or not - 4  -
"detente,"  in quotes,  to a  degree  tended  to  work  insofar as 
llestern  Europe  is concerned.  Berlin is not  the  focus  of 
potential confrontation that it was  a  decade  ago.  The 
relationship across  that  iron curtain in Western  Europe  is  a 
little less difficult than it was  a  decade  ago. 
What  Western  Europeans  failed  to understand,  and  still fail 
to understand,  however,  is from  the United  States point of  view 
detente has been  a  failure.  We  believed that it meant  Soviet 
restraint,  not  simply  in the heart of  Europe,  but on  a 
world-wide basis.  Yet  what  we  have  seen over  the  course of  the 
last decade  is challenges  in Afghanistan,  Poland  and  in Central 
America.  Need  I  go  through  the list?  It is long  and  it is 
troublesome.  So  that  the  ~nited_States in  ~e~ling with its 
world  responsibilities,  Europe,  Western  Europe,  our  NATO 
allies,  dealing more  and  more  with their  immediate 
difficulties,  have  tended  to  some  degree  to move  farther apart 
with  regard  to what  I  would  have  to describe  as basic 
interest.  This  is not  to say that  we  don't all recognize  there 
are difficult problems  on  a  day-to-day basis  in dealing with 
Western  Europe.  But  I  think  we  also tend  to  look  upon  those 
difficulties as  the difficulties of  friends  whose  interests are 
basically identical. - 5  -
Now,  I  am  not  here  today to say that our Western  European 
interests have  so  diverged  that nothing  can be  done  about  it. 
I  am  here to say,  however,  that  I  think there  is  a  fundamental 
process at  work  which  we  had better think  about  and  think  about 
hard.  I  think it is probably true that  for  the rest of this 
century,  no  matter  what  else may  happen  in this world,  our 
security interests in that TransAtlantic security tie are  going 
to be  absolutely essential to the maintenance  of peace. 
Now,  you  combine  that with  something else that  I  think is 
happening:  a  shift in  the  center of gravity and  of  ~~r foreign 
policy intention toward  the  Pacific:  our trade increasing with 
the  Pacific,  and  Japan consistently taking  on  a  more  important 
- -
role,  at least  in  terms  of  the  world  economic  situation.  I 
think it is probably  inevitable that  over  the  course of  the 
next  two  decades  the  United States and  Japan  will either become 
the  two  most  significant competitors  in the field of technology 
development  or  the  two  most  significant cooperators  in  the 
field of  technology. 
It is probably true,  although it is  a  generalization 
subject  to qualification,  that Western  Europe,  at least if it 
continues  the  trends  of  the last five  years,  will fall  farther 
and  farther  behind  in the  technology  development  race.  And  I 
happen myself  to believe  that  in  terms  of  international 
economics  the  future  is precisely in  the area of high - 6  -
technology development.  So  we  face,  as well  as this tendency 
to move  away  from  Western  Europe,  the  problem of  trying to 
manage  over the course of  the next  two  decades  an  increasingly 
complex  relationship with  an  increasingly strong,  economically, 
at least,  Japan.  And  with growing  markets  in the  ASEAN 
countries and  in the  Pacific Basin  as  a  whole. 
If we  are not careful these  two  trends will,  I  think,  tend 
to pull apart  and  the  United  States will  find  itself 
increasingly trying to maintain,  and  unsuccessfully,  I  am 
afraid,  the closeness of  the  relationship with Western  Europe 
while  trying to build the relationship with  the  Pacific.  And  I 
think  more  and  more  our  attention is going  to be  drawn  toward 
the  Pacific and  toward  trying to manage  that competition or 
cooperation with  Japan. 
In  the process,  I  think  we  are setting  up  a  series of 
stresses and  strains,  which  for  the policymaker  in the course 
of  the  next  two  decades  is going to become  increasingly 
difficult to manage. 
This  ignors  questions  such  as  u.s.-soviet relations  and  how 
those  wfll affect this process.  My  own  judgment  is that the 
u.s.-soviet relationship,  barring unforeseen crises,  is largely 
irrelevant to the  process  I  have described  to you.  This  is 
true except  in  the  sense  that if,  in  fact,  the  security - 7  -
relationship and  the  intimacy of  the  relationship with Western 
Europe  changes  substantially, it inevitably will lead the 
Soviet  Union  to look  upon  the area as  one  in which 
opportunities exist  for  mischief-making.  On  the basis of  60 
years of history,  I  think  we  can  assume  that the Soviets  would 
not  lightly let that chance  go by.  So  this  issue does  have  a 
relationship to the  future of the u.s.-soviet relationship.  If 
not  managed  well it is an  impact  that  can have  its own 
deliterious consequences. 
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